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Abstract
Mobile participatory sensing could be used in many applications such
as vehicular traffic monitoring, pollution tracking, or even health survey-
ing. However, its success depends on finding a solution for querying large
numbers of users which protects user location privacy and works in real-
time. This paper presents PAMPAS, a privacy-aware mobile distributed
system for efficient data aggregation in mobile participatory sensing. In
PAMPAS, mobile devices enhanced with secure hardware, called secure
probes (SPs), perform distributed query processing, while preventing users
from accessing other users’ data. A supporting server infrastructure (SSI)
coordinates the inter-SP communication and the computation tasks ex-
ecuted on SPs. PAMPAS ensures that SSI cannot link the location re-
ported by SPs to the user identities even if SSI has additional background
information. In addition to its novel system architecture, PAMPAS also
proposes two new protocols for privacy-aware location-based aggregation
and adaptive spatial partitioning of SPs that work efficiently on resource-
constrained SPs. Our experimental results and security analysis demon-
strate that these protocols are able to collect the data, aggregate them,
and share statistics or derived models in real-time, without any location
privacy leakage.
1 Introduction
There is an increasing interest in mobile participatory sensing for urban monitor-
ing, which appears to be a better alternative to traditional infrastructure-based
sensing to cope with the high installation and maintenance costs, as well as
the coverage limitation. Many projects have been conducted recently around
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the world - or are still ongoing - in the area of environmental participatory
sensing [Pen14], such as Citi-Sense in Oslo, CamMobSens at Cambridge, Met-
roSense at Dartmouth, and OpenSense in Switzerland. Also, many applications
that exploit the sensing features of smartphones are already available. Examples
include community based traffic monitoring (e.g., Waze1, or Navigon2), finding
available parking spaces or noise mapping [DEAS12]. In addition, the emerging
lightweight low-cost sensors are changing the paradigm of environmental and
health monitoring3, and allow measuring in real-time the individual exposure
to environmental risk factors or the propagation of an epidemic.
In these scenarios, the community members act as mobile probes and con-
tribute to spatial aggregate statistics, which in turn, benefit the whole commu-
nity, e.g., dynamic traffic navigation or air quality mapping and alerts. Various
statistics are of interest: basic count and density, average of reported measures
by location and time, or more complex geo-statistical operations such as spatial
interpolation [NWL12]. Unfortunately, most current mobile participatory sens-
ing systems (MPSS) require users to reveal their locations to trusted monitoring
servers, which raises serious privacy concerns because user identity could be de-
termined based on several locations that are linked to the same user [dMHVB13].
We should stress that, even if users might trust a centralized service, privacy
violation examples are legions (see for example DataLossDB.org) coming from
negligence, abusive use, internal or external attacks, and such violations affect
even the most secured servers. In addition to location, sensing data reported
by users could be privacy-sensitive as well. These privacy issues prevent a wide
adoption of MPSS.
Several works consider the MPSS privacy problem such as [DEAS12], [BOT13],
[DSJ13], [QLM+11], [TRL+09]. However, most approaches require trusting a
proxy server [DSJ13], [TRL+09], while others are too costly [DEAS12], [BOT13],
or sacrifice sensing accuracy for privacy [QLM+11].
Hence, providing a high-quality MPSS, while protecting the users’ privacy,
is still a challenge. Recently, the emergence of personal secure devices has
opened new perspectives in personal data protection. Be it a secure portable
token [ANP14], [TNP14] communicating with the user’s smartphone or plugged
inside it (e.g., Google Vault4), a tamper-resistant hardware security module
securing the on-board computer of a vehicle [FNSA12], or the secure TrustZone
CPU [ARM09] of the ARM cortex-A series equipping most of mobile devices
today, all such secure devices offer tangible, hardware-based security guarantees.
We leverage their secure data processing capability in a distributed, privacy-by-
design architecture, providing an alternative to the traditional server-centric
architecture. Our belief is that, similar to TrustZone CPU, such secure devices
will become ubiquitous in the near future, equipping by default users’ mobile
devices. As such, there will be no need for users to buy and connect external
hardware to participate in MPPS applications.
This paper presents PAMPAS, a Privacy-Aware Mobile Participatory Sens-
ing system for efficient mobile distributed query processing in the context of
MPSS. The novelty of PAMPAS is two-fold: (1) it provides a system architec-
1http://www.waze.com
2http://navigon.com
3http://www.epa.gov/heasd/airsensortoolbox/
4http://www.cnet.com/news/googles-project-vault-is-a-security-chip-disguised-as-an-
micro-sd-card/
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ture that protects users’ location privacy by preventing location tracking from
any third-party server; and (2) it provides efficient aggregation protocols that
satisfy the MPSS real-time constraints in spite of the resource limitations of
secure devices. The privacy guarantee gives users strong incentives for partici-
pation [GLW+15], in addition to the benefits they get from MPSS applications.
In PAMPAS, all participants have a mobile device enhanced with secure hard-
ware (i.e., any of the types described above), called a secure probe (SP). SPs
act as probes for the target phenomenon, perform distributed query processing,
and share the results with the users. The secure hardware prevents users from
accessing other users’ data during the distributed computation. Secure probes
exchange data in encrypted form with help from a supporting server infrastruc-
ture (SSI). To provide real-time results, PAMPAS employs efficient, parallel,
location-based aggregation protocols which partition the probes according to
their geographic distribution. The construction and the maintenance of these
partitions aim at reducing and balancing the workloads on worker SPs, while
precluding the SSI from doing location-based inference attacks against the par-
ticipants.
We implemented and validated PAMPAS using representative secure hard-
ware platforms. We used two applications for experiments, traffic and noise
monitoring, with both real and synthetic datasets representing small and medium-
size cities. Using these applications, we compared PAMPAS with a state-of-the-
art secure aggregation protocol described in [TNP14]. The experimental results
show that PAMPAS outperforms this protocol in terms of latency and scalabil-
ity, which translates to much lower resource utilization at the user side.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the re-
lated work. Section 3 describes the system architecture of PAMPAS, the threat
model, and the protocol requirements. Section 4 presents the location-based
global aggregation protocol, and Section 5 describes the privacy-aware probe
partitioning protocol. The security analysis is presented in Section 6, while the
experimental results are shown in Section 7. We conclude the paper in Section 8.
2 Related Work
Traditional system architectures used in MPSS such as [DSJ13], [TRL+09] rely
on a centralized server to collect data from mobile participants, process it, and
publish the results. This server-centric model is straightforward and easy to
deploy, run, and maintain. However, this basic approach also raises serious
privacy concerns and prevents a wide adoption of MPSS. An attacker who is
able to link several location reports to the same user can then determine the
identity of the user by leveraging, for example, background information (e.g.,
user home address). Thus, an attacker can identify the MPSS participants and
infer their personal habits and activities [dMHVB13]. In addition to location
which is normally included in MPSS reports, the sensing data reported by users
could be privacy-sensitive as well. The works that address this issue belong to
three classes: (1) server-centric architecture and (2) cryptographic protocols for
MPSS, and (3) secure hardware devices in other contexts.
Server-centric approaches. Virtual trip lines (VTLs) [HIJ+12] deal with
the privacy issue by distributing the traffic monitoring service implementation
across several specialized servers and by providing a spatio-temporal cloaking
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of the users under the VTLs. Although the attack of a single system compo-
nent prevents linking the identity and location of the users, choosing privacy-
insensitive locations for VTLs is tricky and limits the traffic information to a
part of the road network. Also, the problem of multi-component attack (or
collusion) remains, as well as the high cost of building such a complex system
distributed over several components. SpotMe [QLM+11] proposes a different
approach consisting in mixing real user’s location with fake locations before
posting them to a central server. Then, the server estimates the aggregated
user locations by using probability theory. However, the estimation errors can
be important (around 20%), while the number of observed spatial units can-
not exceed a few hundreds. Also, SpotMe involves higher communication costs
because of the large number of fake locations, while linkability may still be a
problem for users who send many consecutive location updates, which limits the
usability of this approach to sporadic updates.
By employing a fully decentralized architecture for computation, PAMPAS
avoids all the above listed problems. Moreover, the trust is enforced by using
cheap but highly secure, tamper-resistant hardware at the user side.
Cryptographic approaches. Another way to protect the users’ privacy
is to use secure cryptographic protocols [BOT13], [DEAS12], [PBBL11]. Typi-
cally, the cryptographic solutions are based on homomorphic encryption schemes
allowing a central-server [PBBL11] or the users [DEAS12] to aggregate the sam-
ples directly on the cyphertext. However, the cryptographic methods have to
face two major limitations. First, homomorphic encryption only allows the com-
putation of basic aggregate functions (e.g., count, average, standard deviation),
while more advanced functions require fully homomorphic encryption schemes,
which are not computationally feasible today. Second, even with the basic ag-
gregate functions, the cryptographic protocols can incur a large computation
and communication cost [BOT13], [PBBL11]. Hence, the existing works typi-
cally limit the size of the monitored space (e.g., the number of roads) and the
monitoring frequency. Therefore, such solutions cannot meet the scalability and
the real-time requirements of MPSS at the same time, and are not generic w.r.t.
the type of aggregate function.
Secure hardware approaches. Recent works have also proposed the use
of secure hardware at the user-side [ANP14], [TNP14]. The trust in such a
distributed architecture in which all computation is done by user devices arises
from two sources: (i) the decentralization, i.e., there is no central-server to be
trusted or to be exposed to attacks having a large benefit/cost ratio; (ii) the
(tamper-resistant) secure hardware at the user-side, which protects the devices
against physical attacks (even from the device holder).
In [ANP14], Allard et al. propose METAP, a privacy-preserving data pub-
lishing protocol in the context of an architecture composed of low power secure
devices and a powerful but un-trusted server in order to release sanitized data
to third parties. However, this data publishing protocol does not consider the
case of spatiotemporal sensed values and cannot be used in participatory sens-
ing aggregations. To et al. [TNP14] propose a similar architecture, but consider
the problem of executing SQL queries over a distributed database without re-
vealing any sensitive information to central servers. Considered in our context,
this protocol incurs high computation and communication costs because of the
specificity of MPSS aggregates (e.g., the aggregate groups are locations, there is
a high number of such groups, the computation is continuous and should follow
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the data generation frequency, the aggregate functions can be complex such as
spatial interpolation).
PAMPAS shares the idea of employing a user-centric decentralized architec-
ture with the above mentioned works. However, unlike existing protocols, its
secure aggregation protocol is adapted to MPSS requirements, i.e., high dynam-
icity of the participants, real-time constraints for computation, complexity of
the aggregate statistics, and low resource utilization.
A centralized solution based on secure hardware could also be devised using
recent proposals to ensure shielded application execution over untrusted servers.
For example, Haven [BPH14] extends the hardware level protection features
provided by the Intel SGX architecture from code snippets to the entire OS. But
there are limitations: this solution slows down the computation substantially;
the entire security architecture depends on the chip manufacturer’s ability to
protect the secret keys; programmers will miss certain features, such as process
creation, that are not supported.
3 System Overview
This section presents the system architecture of PAMPAS, the threat model in
our system, and the data and computation model of the system. Based on these
elements, we derive the requirements for the PAMPAS protocols.
3.1 System Architecture
PAMPAS relies on a hybrid architecture combining secure elements at the user
side (secure probes – SP) and a supporting server infrastructure (SSI) that en-
ables secure exchange of messages between the mobile users. SPs and SSI jointly
run two protocols to exchange sensed sample updates, continuously compute the
spatially aggregated results, and periodically partition SPs according to their
location. This architecture fully protects the users’ privacy w.r.t. the SSI.
Figure 1 shows the general architecture of our system in the context of traffic
monitoring.
Compared to a purely decentralized peer-to-peer (P2P) architecture, this
hybrid architecture has the salient advantage of not consuming any resources
from the participants to maintain the P2P overlay, which is important given
the low resources and availability of the user devices. In addition, it exchanges
messages between SPs in O(1) hops as opposed to the typical O(logN) hops in
P2P networks.
Secure Probe (SP). Each user holds a secure portable device, which can
be implemented by any type of (tamper-resistant) secure devices flourishing to-
day (see Figure 2) and described in Section 1. Whatever its commercial name
and form factor, a secure device, called secure probe (SP) hereafter, embeds at
least a secure micro-controller (MCU) for computation (e.g., a smart card chip)
connected to a large NAND Flash memory for data storage (e.g., an SD card).
An SP plays three roles: (i) mobile probe, (ii) processing node, and (iii) query
issuer. The SP sends encrypted samples (containing spatiotemporal sensed mea-
sures) to SSI, participates in the data aggregation, and receives the final results
from other SPs with the help of SSI. Given their high-level of security, SPs are
considered trusted in our system. However, this feature comes at a price. The
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Figure 1: System architecture
MCU usually has a low power CPU and a tiny RAM (a few tens of KB). In
addition, SPs have low availability since they can be connected/disconnected as
required by the users. Therefore, all the computation and communication with
the SPs have to be highly optimized.
Figure 2: Examples of secure tokens
Supporting Server Infrastructure (SSI). Different from the typical
server-centric architecture, the SSI in our system acts only as a coordinator
for exchanging messages between the SPs and for temporary storage purposes.
Since the SSI is not trusted, all the temporary results stored in the SSI are
encrypted using non-deterministic encryption.
In conclusion, the security and privacy in PAMPAS arise from the combi-
nation of secure hardware with a high degree of distribution of the architecture
(i.e., all computations are executed by some of the SPs). The challenge is then
to be able to continuously compute any type of aggregate functions in real-time
in this user-centric architecture given the low resources of the SPs.
3.2 Threat model
The attackers in PAMPAS could be either users or the owners of SSI. Their goal
is to collect private user information (e.g., location or sensing data). Using this
private information, attackers can determine the user identities and learn their
activities and behaviors. Our goal is to ensure that users cannot read the raw
data reported by other users. The SSI must not be able to read the user raw
data. Also, the SSI must not be able to infer any additional location information
about the participants more than it already knows or could be inferred from the
aggregate result. Hence, the scope of PAMPAS is to fully protect the raw data
and the aggregation process, and does not consider the privacy exposure risks
that arise from analysing the aggregate results, which is a complementary aspect
of this work.
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Even though the users are untrusted, we assume that all the SPs are trusted,
which is reasonable considering that the tamper-resistance of the MCU provides
a high level of protection against physical and side-channel attacks, and in
particular for the data residing in RAM since the RAM memory is located
inside the MCU. We also assume that the hardware manufacturer is trusted
and protects the secrets embedded in SPs. In addition, all the persistently
stored data in the NAND Flash is cryptographically protected.
Furthermore, we assume an honest-but-curious threat model, i.e., the SSI
obeys the protocol it is supposed to do, but may try to infer anything it can
from the data or behaviors is sees. Considering a malicious SSI (i.e., the server
tampers with the protocol, e.g., by dropping messages to infer more information)
is of little interest, since a malicious SSI can be easily detected (e.g., the SPs
that aggregate the data verify if their own samples are present in the data sent
by the server) leading to critical financial/legal consequences for the service.
Finally, we assume that the communication between SPs and SSI is anony-
mous, e.g., by using a proxy forwarder or an anonymization network (e.g., Tor)
We assume such systems are able to hide the packet origin from an adversary, so
that privacy cannot be compromised by a malicious server searching to recog-
nize the origin of the uploaded messages. Let us emphasize that IP anonymity
is not enough to protect the user privacy in MPSS because identity information
could be determined from the location and sensing data.
3.3 Data and Computation Models
Data model. PAMPAS is designed to be generic with respect to the type of
computation required by participatory sensing applications. In most cases, such
applications require the aggregation of geo-localized and time-stamped sensed
values collected by the sensing devices of the participants. Therefore, a partici-
pant’s device periodically generates an update in the form sample = (location,
time, value), which is encrypted and sent to the SSI. PAMPAS does not im-
pose any restriction on the generation frequency of samples, which may depend
on the application sample generation policy. However, the system should be
efficient and scalable for a large number of participants and a high generation
frequency of samples. Also, the participants’ privacy should be fully protected
independent of the number and spatiotemporal distribution of the samples. Fur-
thermore, PAMPAS considers two types of locations corresponding to the two
typical types of movements of users: (i) free movements in the two-dimensional
space, i.e., location = (x, y); (ii) movements constrained by a transportation
network (e.g., road or railroad network), i.e., location = (rid, pos), where rid
is the road identifier and pos is the relative position on the road. Finally, the
value corresponds to the sensed measure (e.g., traffic speed, noise level, etc.).
Query model. Given a stream of samples and an aggregate function, PAM-
PAS produces a spatiotemporal aggregation of the sample stream such as the
stream-SQL-like [JMS+08] query formulation in Figure 3. The aggregation is
temporal since the result is computed continuously over time as long as it is re-
quired or whenever the number of participants exceeds some predefined thresh-
old. In this way, the spatiotemporal evolution of the measure of interest is
monitored over time. To this end, PAMPAS divides the stream using a sliding
time window (see Figure 3) and computes an aggregate result based on all the
samples generated in the time window. The final aggregation result is a spatial
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function representing the evolution in space of the observed measure in the re-
spective time window. For instance, the result can be the noise heat-map in the
covering area of a city or the average travel time in a road network. As with the
duration of observation, we do not impose any restrictions regarding the extent
of the observed space.
Figure 3: Spatial-temporal aggregates in PAMPAS
Spatial units. As shown in the above query, spatial aggregates are based
on a discrete referential space, i.e., a finite set of spatial units. Without loss of
generality, we consider two types of referential spaces corresponding to the two
types of users’ movements. In the case of free movement, we consider a uniform
grid and each grid cell corresponds to a spatial unit. The size of the units is
determined based on the application requirements, space size, number of partic-
ipants, etc. In the case of constrained movement by a transportation network,
we consider that a spatial unit corresponds to a network (road) segment, i.e., the
network path connecting two adjacent network nodes (e.g., the road segment
between two intersections). In both cases, the number of spatial units can be
large (e.g., hundreds of thousands). The COUNT in the query model is optional
and is required in the aggregation protocol to check the probes partitioning.
Aggregate functions. PAMPAS can compute most types of aggregate
statistics required by participatory sensing applications. Practically, our sys-
tem can compute in real-time any type of function having reasonable time and
space complexity given the relative low CPU power and little RAM of the SP.
For illustrative purpose, we consider three classes of functions in this paper:
(i) Typical algebraic functions: count, sum, average, standard deviation. Such
aggregate functions are the most popular in the works related to participatory
sensing [DEAS12], [BOT13], [PBBL11]. These functions allow for example to
compute the average travel time or the traffic density in a road network; (ii)
Specific functions: inverse distance weighting (IDW). For instance, an applica-
tion monitoring the noise pollution in the city could use the IDW function to
compute a heat-map of the noise level in the entire space [NWL12]; (iii) Holistic
functions: median, percentile, top-k. Such functions are also frequently used
in statistical computations. Their particularity is that the computation of the
result requires accessing the entire sample set and cannot be achieved incremen-
tally by accessing only subsets of samples as with the previous two classes of
functions.
An important observation is that cryptographic solutions based on homo-
morphic encryption cannot be applied for specific or holistic functions (see Sec-
tion 2). Also, the holistic functions cannot be computed efficiently in a dis-
tributed architecture by the secure protocol proposed in [TNP14] (as shown in
Section 7).
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Table 1: Notations used in the algorithms
Notation Description
Gi Identifier of probe group i
Ek Symmetric deterministic encryption
nEk
Symmetric non-deterministic
encryption
E−1k Symmetric deterministic decryption
nE−1k
Symmetric non-deterministic
decryption
P fakeGi
Probability to send a fake message in
group i
N Number of spatial units
NG Number of probe groups
QIcomm
Degradation factor of the
communication time
QIcomp
Degradation factor of the
computation time
Comp timei Computation time for the group i
3.4 Protocol Requirements
In the light of the above description of the proposed user-centric architecture,
the PAMPAS protocols have to deal with the following challenges: (i) Privacy :
By keeping all the sensitive data in the SPs, the adopted user-centric archi-
tecture matches this requirement in contrast with a server-centric architecture.
In short, the computation protocol should not reveal to the SSI any additional
information about the participants’ paths besides what the SSI can infer from
the aggregate result. (ii) Generality : the protocols should be able to compute
any type of function over the spatiotemporal sensed measures by the mobile
users and covering a large observation space. This is different from the works
based on cryptographic approaches in which, typically, only basic computation
(e.g., simple aggregates like sum, average) can be achieved and only in specific
locations over limited periods of time. (iii) Efficiency : the protocols should be
highly efficient to be able to continuously compute the aggregate results in real-
time with very limited resources. Indeed, for economic and security reasons,
the SPs used for data processing have low resources and limited availability.
Hence, it is necessary to minimize the computation and communication costs of
the PAMPAS protocols. (iv) Scalability : the protocols should allow PAMPAS
to scale to a large number of participants (e.g., up to millions of users), high
sampling frequencies, and very large regions. (v) Accuracy : PAMPAS should
continuously reflect the sensed measures with good precision. In other words,
protecting the users’ privacy should not impact the accuracy of the aggregate
result computed by the protocols.
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Figure 4: Workflow representation of the global protocol in PAMPAS
4 Global Aggregation Protocol
The global privacy-preserving protocol in PAMPAS consists in three phases that
are repeatedly executed in pipeline (see Figure 4). First, the SSI collects all the
sensing updates sent by the participants for a period equal to the sliding time
window (i.e., the collection period). Each update is encrypted using symmetric
non-deterministic encryption so that the SSI cannot gain any knowledge from
these updates. All the SPs share a secret key, which is renewed periodically
to increase security. The key is generated randomly by a randomly chosen SP.
To distribute the secrete key, we assume the users authenticate using a typical
PKI infrastructure, i.e., a certificate is embedded in each user secure hardware.
Whenever a new SP connects to the system, it authenticates using its certificate.
Then, the SP randomly contacts another connected SP, which sends back the
current shared secret key encrypted with the public key of this newly connected
SP.
The shared secret key is used by the SPs to symmetrically encrypt the update
messages (e.g., by using AES encryption) so that any SP can decrypt messages
and aggregate the data. Note that, although an SP can decrypt the updates, a
user is not allowed to access the decrypted data in her SP and that the tamper-
resistant hardware protects the transiting data from the user. Therefore, as for
the SSI, the users have access only to the final results and not to the raw data.
At the end of the collection period, the SSI triggers the processing period.
In this phase, only a small subset of SPs, which are randomly selected by the
SSI, are involved. The SSI partitions the collected samples such that the num-
ber of updates in a partition can fit the RAM resources of an SP (otherwise,
the persistent Flash storage of the SP has to be used incurring a much higher
computation cost). Then, each sample partition is sent to an SP, which com-
putes a partial aggregate result for the received updates. The encrypted results
are sent back to the SSI. Finally, the delivery period consists of delivering the
current partial aggregate results to the queriers. Each querier needs to perform
the final aggregation of these partial results, which is merely a concatenation of
the demanded partial results.
Algorithms 1 and 2 give the detailed description of the operations executed
by the SSI and the SPs respectively. In the following, we denote by Ek and nEk
the symmetric deterministic and non-deterministic encryption with the key k,
and by E−1k and nE
−1
k the opposite decryption operations while Gi indicates
the identifier of group i. All the notations used in the algorithms are listed in
Table 1.
To address the performance limitations of the existing protocols [TNP14] (see
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Algorithm 1: PAMPAS Protocol at the SSI-side
1 collection period():
2 /* Receive encrypted updates from SPs */
3 while (true) do
4 message = (Ek(Gi), nEk(sample))
5 store(message)→ list[Ek(Gi)][currentT imeWindow]
6 processing period():
7 foreach i in {Ek(Gi)} do
8 /* feed in parallel the randomly selected SPs */
9 randomly select SPi ∈ Ek(Gi)
10 while message← list[Ek(Gi)][lastT imeWindow] do
11 send(message, SPi)
12 foreach i in {Ek(Gi)} do
13 /*Receive the final results from worker SPs*/
14 enc resultfinali = (Ek(Gi), nEk(result))
15 delivery period():
16 foreach i in {Ek(Gi)} do
17 /*Push resulti to all requesting SPs*/
18 multicast(enc resultfinali , {SPk})
Section 2), the aggregation protocol in PAMPAS groups the participants based
on their location, which permits processing together the generated samples in
a group by a single SP. To this end, the users also send the deterministically
encrypted value of the spatial unit they are currently located in, in addition
to the non-deterministically encrypted value of the sample, i.e., message =
(Ek(groupID), nEk(sample)) (Algorithm 1, lines 4-5 and Algorithm 2, lines 3-
4). Consequently, the SSI can group the messages based on the encrypted unit
number and then send each group of samples to a different SP for aggregation
(lines 7-11 in Algorithm 1 and lines 10-12 in Algorithm 2). By doing so, the
advantage is manifold. First, the processing period is guaranteed to terminate in
a single iteration, since each involved SP produces directly the aggregation result
corresponding to a spatial unit. This greatly improves both the computation
and the communication cost of the aggregation process. Second, data processing
by an SP is also efficient since only one aggregate is computed, which greatly
reduces the RAM requirements and avoids/reduces the usage of the persistent
storage. Third, the final aggregate result is also partitioned and the queriers
can demand the results only for specific spatial units, which further improves
the communication cost. Furthermore, in order to avoid leaking information
regarding the spatial distribution of users, the SPs also generate and send fake
messages to the SSI (see Algorithm 2, lines 6-8). The rational and detailed
explanation for this technique are discussed in the next section.
However, despite all these benefits, the above approach has one fundamental
shortcoming originating from the skewed spatial distribution of the participants.
Although the exact location of the updates and the unit ID are hidden, the SSI
knows the number of participants in each spatial unit. If the SSI has access to
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Algorithm 2: PAMPAS Protocol at the SP-side
1 collection period(): /* for all SPs */
2 /* Generate and send the sensing update: update(Gi, sample) */
3 message = (Ek(Gi), nEk(sample))
4 send(message, SSI)
5 /* Send a fake sample to the SSI with probability P fakeGi */
6 if rand(0, 100) >= P fakeGi then
7 fake message = (Ek(Gi), nEk(fake sample))
8 send(fake message, SSI)
9 processing period(): /* only for the selected SPs, one for each
Gi */
10 while message = receive(SSI) do
11 sample = nE−1k (message)
12 result = result⊕ sample
13 enc resultfinali = (Ek(Gi), nEk(result))
14 send(enc resultfinali , SSI)
15 delivery period(): /* for all SPs */
16 /* Pull the results for required {Gi} from the SSI */
17 foreach i in {Ek(Gi)} do
18 send request(Ek(Gi), SSI)
19 resultfinali = nE
−1
k (receive(SSI))
side information about the spatial distribution of the users (e.g., global traffic
density information), it may use this information to infer the (approximate)
location of the participants and compromise their privacy.
5 Probe Partitioning Protocol
To counter the privacy threats that are rooted in the skewed spatial distribution
of the participants, PAMPAS continuously partitions the set of probes based on
their current location and the spatial units of the query. Similar to the global
aggregation protocol, this privacy-aware partitioning protocol is executed by
SPs. The idea is to group SPs located in adjacent spatial units such that the
resulted probe groups have approximately the same size. Therefore, in PAMPAS
a group Gi covers several spatial units (as defined in Section 3.3) and includes
all the SPs in these units.
The probe partitioning has to be recomputed periodically to keep the groups
balanced since the users’ distribution in space changes over time. Moreover, the
groups should contain users located in closely situated spatial units to maximize
the lifetime of a partitioning. The challenge is to implement a partitioning
algorithm that can be executed periodically at SPs because the typical spatial
partitioning algorithms are much too costly to be considered in our context (i.e.,
limited-resources SPs).
Our algorithm is based on the following idea. We use a space-filling curve
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Figure 5: Hilbert indexing of spatial units
to index the spatial units of the application query. A space-filling curve has the
property to map a multidimensional space to a one-dimensional space such that,
for two objects that are close in the original space, there is a high probability
that they will be close in the mapped target space. Then, we sort the spatial
units on the space-filing curve index. Once sorted, an approximate balanced
grouping can be checked and computed in O(NG) space complexity and O(N)
time complexity, where NG is the number of probe groups, and N is the number
of spatial units.
Indexing the spatial units. In our system, we use Hilbert curves, but
other types of space-filling curves can be used as well to index the spatial units
considered by the participatory sensing application (e.g., z-curves). In the case
of free movement, the indexing is straightforward since the space is already
partitioned with a uniform grid (see Figure 5 left). Then, we cover the grid
cells with the Hilbert curve corresponding to the grid granularity and label each
cell with the obtained Hilbert index. In the case of constrained movement, the
indexing requires two steps. First, we cover the transportation network with a
uniform grid (see Figure 5 right). The grid granularity is chosen such that the
number of network segments (see Section 3.3) intersecting with a grid cell is low
for most of the cells. Then, the grid cells are indexed with a Hilbert curve and
each network segment is labeled with the Hilbert index of the cell containing the
segment center. In case several segments are contained by a cell, the segments
are sorted by the x-coordinate and the y-coordinate of their centers and labeled
accordingly. Once the spatial units are indexed, they are sorted on the index
value and the sorted unit vector is broadcasted to all the participants to be used
in the probe partitioning phase.
Checking and repartitioning the probe grouping. Periodically, our
system verifies if the current probes partitioning is still balanced with respect
to the number of probes in each group. The verification frequency depends on
the dynamicity of users in space. In PAMPAS, the checking and repartitioning
processes can be executed often (i.e., every few seconds) due to their low cost.
When a partitioning checking is triggered, the system computes a count aggre-
gate in addition to the application aggregate function (see Figure 3), which gives
the actual number of users (SPs) in all the spatial units. The count aggregate
result is then pushed to an SP randomly chosen by the SSI. The checker SP
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Algorithm 3: Checking probe partitioning (SP-side)
1 check probe partitioning():/* one randomly selected SP */
2 /* Pull all the results from the SSI */
3 foreach i in {Ek(Gi)} do
4 send request(Ek(Gi), SSI)
5 enc resultfinali = receive(SSI)
6 allCounts[Gi][]← E−1k (enc result
final
i )
7 update localy stored counts for spatial units /* also required to
compute the probability to generate fake samples */
8 compute weights[Gi] = SUM(allCounts[Gi][])
9 compute standard deviation(weights)
10 if standard deviation(weights) < threshold then
11 send for broadcast(nEk(allCounts), SSI)
12 else
13 execute probes repartitioning()
decrypts the results and updates the weights5 of the sorted spatial unit vector
(lines 4-7 in Algorithm 3). This operation has O(N) complexity assuming that
a small index containing the partitions frontiers is kept in memory by the SP
(which requires only NG Flash addresses to be kept in RAM). At the same
time, the SP computes in memory the count by group (since the groups are
sent one by one by the SSI, line 8 in Algorithm 3) and compares the counts. If
the balancing of the current probes partitioning is within the predefined limits,
the checker SP sends the current values to all the other SPs (i.e., exchanged
encrypted through SSI), which update the weights of the spatial units with the
new count values. Otherwise, the checker SP computes a new partitioning.
Once the sorted vector of spatial units is updated with the new weight val-
ues, the probe repartitioning can be efficiently computed in O(N) and O(NG)
time and space complexity respectively (see Algorithm 4). To set the partition
borders we use a greedy algorithm, which adds spatial units to a group as long
as the total weight of the group is lower than a threshold value (lines 12-16 in
Algorithm 4). The threshold is computed as the ratio between the total number
of probes and the number of groups (line 10 in Algorithm 4), and represents
the average number of users per group. The partitioning result is a list of NG
milestones indicating the group borders in the sorted index of spatial units (line
15 in Algorithm 4). The result is then encrypted and delivered, through SSI,
to all users, which update their partitioning data and generate new samples
accordingly starting from the next computation window.
The proposed probes partitioning algorithm has low complexity and can be
efficiently executed even with the low resources of an SP. However, the parti-
tioning algorithm cannot guarantee a certain degree of balancing of the partition
weights. Yet, the partitioning balancing is required to avoid leaking any infor-
mation regarding the spatial distribution of users. To deal with this problem,
the SPs generate fake samples in all the probe groups having a number of users
lower than the maximum size group. Therefore, in the collection period of each
5The weight is the number of probes in a spatial unit.
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Algorithm 4: Repartitioning process (SP-side)
1 PROBE REPARTITIONING():/* one randomly selected SP */
2 compute QIcomp and QIcomm for current NG
3 while true do
4 /* adjust the number of groups NG */
5 if QIcomp > QIcomm then
6 tNG = 2 ∗NG
7 else
8 tNG = NG/2
9 /* repartition for tNG */
10 avgGroupWeight = SUM(allCounts[])/tNG
11 currentGroupWeight = 0
12 for i = 0 to N − 1 do
13 currentGroupWeight+ = allCounts[i]
14 if currentGroupWeight ≈ avgGroupWeight then
15 newPartitionMilestones[].add(i)
16 currentGroupWeight = 0
17 /* check if the new partitioning for tNG is better than for NG*/
18 compute tQIcomp and tQIcomm for tNG
19 if tQIcomp + tQIcomm < QIcomp + QIcomm then
20 NG = tNG; QIcomp = tQIcomp
21 QIcomm = tQIcomm
22 else
23 break
24 message = allCounts[]||newPartitionMilestones[]
25 send for broadcast(nEk(message), SSI)
computing time window, an SP sends probabilistically a dummy sample in ad-
dition to the real sample. The probability to send a fake sample is proportional
to the difference between the maximum size group and the number of users in
the SP’s group, and inversely proportional to the number of users in the group
(see Algorithm 2, lines 6-8). The same approach is used to hide the number
of spatial units in each group. At the end of the aggregation phase, each ag-
gregating SP adds to the result a number of fake values equal to the difference
between the maximum number of units in the groups and the number of units
in the current group. In this way, all the partial aggregate results received by
the SSI have the same size and the SSI cannot infer the number of cells in any
group. Note that the fake values are filtered out by the worker or querier SPs
and therefore have no impact on the accuracy of the results.
QIcomp = Maxi=1,NG [Comp timei]−Maxj=1,N [Comp timej ] (1)
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QIcomm =
size(sample)
bandwidth
NG∑
i=1
{Maxj=1,NG [Countj(probes)] −
Counti(probes)} +
size(sample)
bandwidth
NG∑
i=1
{Maxj=1,NG [Countj(spatialUnits)] −
Counti(spatialUnits)} (2)
Choosing the Number of Probe Groups. The cost of the aggregation
protocol is composed of the computation cost at the SP side and the communi-
cation cost between the SSI and the SP. The number of probe groups impacts
both the computation and the communication costs. Specifically, the computa-
tion cost decreases with the increase in the number of groups and attains the
minimum value when the number of groups is equal to the number of spatial
cells, i.e., an SP is used to aggregate the samples for each spatial unit. But
increasing the number of groups leads to a higher imbalance in the groups’
weights, which in turn requires injecting more fake samples and enlarges the
communication cost. Therefore, modifying the number of groups has opposite
effect on the computation and the communication cost.
PAMPAS computes two quality indicators to measure the impact of the
number of groups on the computation and communication costs, i.e., QIcomp and
QIcomm, as defined by Formulas (1) and (2). QIcomp estimates the degradation
of the computation time at the SP side generated by the fact that several spatial
cell aggregates are delegated to one SP instead of using one SP for each cell.
Estimating the computation time is fairly simple since the time is typically
linear with the number of samples to be processed by the SP, assuming that
the aggregation can be entirely processed in RAM. However, the cost model
can be extended to the case in which it is required to access the secondary
storage. QIcomm estimates the degradation of the communication cost caused
by the imbalance of the group weights. The first term indicates the overhead
incurred by the fake samples generated to balance the groups, while the second
term measures the overhead of generating fake results to balance the number of
aggregate results in each group.
Each time an SP computes the probe partitioning, it also computes the
values of QIcomp and QIcomm (line 2 in Algorithm 4). If QIcomp > QIcomm,
the SP multiplies by two the number of groups and re-partitions the probes. If
QIcomp < QIcomm the SP divides by two the number of groups and re-partitions
the probes (lines 5-8 in Algorithm 4). The SP continues to adjust the number of
groups until QIcomp +QIcomm has minimum value (lines 19-23 in Algorithm 4),
meaning that the aggregation cost is near optimal. Thus, this process allows
adapting the number of groups to the number and the spatial distribution of
the probes.
6 Security and Privacy Analysis
6.1 Security Analysis
The users cannot read the raw data of other users because the data stored in
memory is protected by the secure MCU (i.e., the RAM is located inside the
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MCU) and the data stored in NAND Flash are cryptographically protected.
The SSI does not have the encryption key, so it cannot access the transiting
data. In addition, the non-deterministic encryption protects the data against
frequency-based attacks. The SSI may also try to buy an SP and pass for a
user to gain access to the shared encryption key. However, this would be useless
since the tamper-resistance of an SP protects the key. The SSI could collude
with a querier, but it will gain access only to the aggregate result. Finally, since
the samples are communicated through anonymizers, the SSI cannot identify
the senders or link consecutive messages from the same user.
The SSI could try to infer information from the deterministically encrypted
group ID values. Nevertheless, the SSI cannot perform a frequency-based at-
tack using the encrypted group ID, since all the groups contain approximately
the same number of messages. Therefore, the SSI cannot infer the correspond-
ing (approximate) location of a group or the topological neighborhood of the
groups (which would be the first step to attack the users’ privacy). Hence, the
only knowledge the SSI acquires is the number of groups and its evolution over
time, which does not endanger the users’ privacy. Note that even if the SSI
has somehow access to the full partitioning information and the corresponding
encrypted ID, a user is still hidden under the corresponding group area and
within the crowd in the same group (let us recall that the messages are sent
anonymously so it is hard for the server to link the messages coming from the
same user). Hence, the protocols are secure and fully protect the privacy of the
users.
Although, protecting the privacy of users beyond the aggregate results is out
of the scope of this paper (as discussed in Section 3.2), one can easily integrate
basic protection mechanisms in PAMPAS for such cases. For example, to avoid
the risk of exposure for the users situated in very sparse areas (e.g., a single user
or very few users located in a spatial unit), we can simply add a predicate in the
HAVING clause of the aggregate query (see Figure 3) indicating the minimum
number of users in a spatial unit. In this way, the sparse spatial units are
eliminated from the aggregate results. Another solution is to increase the size
of the sliding window, or of the spatial units accordingly.
6.2 Privacy Analysis
To underline the high level of privacy protection of PAMPAS w.r.t. the SSI, we
consider an entropy-based metric and apply it in the context of two scenarios
that are related to our architecture. We then compare the privacy leakage in
these two scenarios with the privacy leakage in PAMPAS.
Entropy is a popular metric to describe location privacy in general [Dam14],
and it is also appropriate to describe the privacy-preserving mechanism of PAM-
PAS. Commonly, entropy is used to quantify the average degree of uncertainty
associated with a set of events. In the case of location privacy, the idea is to
prevent user identification by obfuscating her exact location in a spatial region
containing a certain number of individuals. Therefore, the level of privacy is
directly related to the popularity (i.e., number of individual footprints) of the
region. This means the higher the popularity, the higher the privacy level of the
users in that region. Then, entropy is used to quantify the degree of popularity
of a region. Formally, let reg be a spatial region and let U(reg) = {u1, u2, . . . up}
be the set of users in region reg. Let fi (with 1 ≤ i ≤ p) be the number of
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sample updates (i.e., footprints) that user ui sends from reg and F =
∑p
i=1 fi
be the total number of sample updates sent from reg.
Definition 1 Entropy of a region: the entropy of region reg is defined as:
E(reg) = −
p∑
i=1
fi
F . log
fi
F
Definition 2 Popularity of a region: the popularity of region reg is defined as:
Pop(reg) = 2E(reg)
Definition 3 Privacy leakage: the privacy leakage for each updatek sent by
user ui is defined as: priv leakui(updatek) =
1
Pop(location of updatek)
To compute the privacy leakage in different cases, we consider a simple nu-
merical example inspired by the datasets used in our experimental evaluation
(see Section 7.1). Let us consider that 200 thousand users participate in a mobile
sensing application that aggregates data over 20 thousand spatial units (e.g.,
road segments in a road network). To keep the formulas tractable (but without
loss of generality), let us consider that each user produces 50 samples from 50
distinct spatial units. This implies that on average, there are 500 footprints
(i.e., updates) in each spatial unit.
Scenario 1: there is no grouping of the probes. Each participant sends the
non-deterministically encrypted value of a sample together with the determinis-
tically encrypted value of the spatial unit identifier to allow an efficient aggrega-
tion of the data. However, no fake sample is inserted by the probes. Although
the spatial unit identifiers are encrypted, the SSI could easily determine the lo-
cation of the spatial units if it has access to the global spatial distribution of the
probes (i.e., a frequency-based attack). In this case, the average entropy of a spa-
tial unit by applying Definition 1 is E(s.unit) = −
∑500
i=1
1
500 .log
1
500 = log(500),
which gives a popularity of Pop(s.unit) = 500 and an average privacy leakage of
priv leak = 0.002 for each update. Clearly, the privacy leakage can be lower or
higher for each spatial unit depending on the popularity value compared with
the average value.
Scenario 2: there is a static partitioning of probes, i.e., the spatial units
are statically partitioned into a number of groups containing closely located
spatial units. As in the previous case, the probes send the deterministically
encrypted value of the spatial group and are also exposed to a frequency-based
attack from the SSI. However, grouping many spatial units leads to decreasing
the privacy leakage risk (but at the cost of increased aggregation time). For
instance, partitioning the spatial units in 200 groups (i.e., 100 spatial units per
group), leads to an average popularity Pop(group) = 103 and thus an average
privacy leakage priv leak(update) = 10−3, which is smaller than in the previous
scenario. Also, the obfuscation region is much larger since it corresponds to 100
spatial units instead of one.
PAMPAS goes even further in the protection of the participants’ privacy by
using a dynamic partitioning of the probes based on their location and spa-
tial distribution. The adaptive partitioning produces nearly balanced groups
of probes. In addition, the eventual imbalance of the groups is corrected by
injecting fake tuples, which precludes the SSI doing frequency-based attacks.
This means that it is extremely difficult for the SSI to estimate even the ap-
proximate corresponding area of each group. Therefore, in our case, the en-
tropy applies indistinguishably to all the participants leading the a popularity
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Figure 6: Aggregation maps for two applications: noise monitoring (left) and
traffic monitoring (right)
Pop(group) = 2·106 and an average privacy leakage priv leak(update) = 5·10−7.
Practically, in PAMPAS, the privacy leakage depends only on the total number
of participants, while the obfuscation area corresponds to the entire observation
space. Besides, the number of groups is adaptively chosen such as to minimize
the aggregation cost.
7 Experimental Evaluation
The goals of our experimental evaluation are twofold: (i) compare the execu-
tion time and scalability of PAMPAS with those of a state-of-the-art protocol
described in [TNP14]; (ii) quantify the cost and scalability of our partitioning
protocol. We implemented and validated PAMPAS through emulations using
secure tokens which have a hardware configuration representative for secure
hardware platforms. As applications for our experiments, we used traffic moni-
toring and noise monitoring with both real and synthetic datasets representing
small and medium-size cities. Figure 6 illustrates our graphic interface for these
applications; it shows the aggregate results for the noise heat-map and the av-
erage travel time for the road network. A demo of our prototype was presented
in [TTSPZ15] using a traffic monitoring scenario.
7.1 Experimental Setting
Hardware platform. In our experimental evaluation, the SSI is hosted on
a PC (3.1 GHz i5-2400, 8GB RAM, running Windows 7) which also displays
the aggregate results in a graphical form for validation purpose. The SPs are
implemented by representative secure hardware devices (see Figure 7) which
includes an MCU with a 32-bit RISC CPU at 120MHz, a cryptographic co-
processor implementing AES and SHA, 128KB of static RAM and 1MB of NOR
Flash to store the software stack, a smartcard chip hosting the cryptographic
credentials (i.e., the secrete encryption keys) and an SD card reader allowing
for a large storage capacity. We used a commodity SD card (Samsung SDHC
Essential Class 10 of 32GB) as secondary Flash storage. The SSI in our testing
system manages a multi-channel Ethernet connection with a global bandwidth of
100Mbps. Importantly, on the SP’s side, our implementation limits the RAM
consumption to only 30KB and the maximum communication bandwidth to
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Figure 7: Secure tokens
200Kbps to validate the proposed protocols with less powerful secure devices.
Thus, in our experiments, all the SPs have this minimalist configuration. To
emulate a very large number of SPs, we execute sequentially on an SP the
aggregate computations and communications for all the worker SPs and measure
the ”parallel” execution time as the maximum aggregation time in the execution
sequence.
Baseline system. To underline the importance of the PAMPAS protocols,
we implemented the secure protocol proposed in [TNP14] and took it as the
baseline. This protocol can be applied without modification to aggregate the
samples collected in each time window. Since PAMPAS offers the same level
of security and privacy as the baseline protocol, our experimental evaluation
focuses on the efficiency part. Note that in [TNP14], two more protocols are
proposed that are even more expensive than the secure protocol if considered
in our context.
Datasets and aggregate functions. We use both synthetic and real
datasets to test the efficiency and scalability of PAMPAS. We employed the
well-known Brinkhoff generator [Bri02] to generate mobility traces on two real
road networks of the cities of Oldenburg (Germany) and Stockton (San Joaquin
County, CA). Oldenburg is a small size network having 7035 road segments,
while Stockton is a medium size road network having 24123 segments. Depend-
ing on the network size, we generated traces corresponding to a medium and
large number of users. With Oldenburg, the medium and large datasets contain
47 thousand and 270 thousand users respectively. With Stockton, the medium
and large datasets contain 200 thousand and 1.35 million users respectively.
The spatial distribution of the traces follows the network spatial density. Com-
pared to the existing real datasets, the synthetic datasets have the prominent
advantage of having excellent spatial and temporal coverage. However, it is also
important to validate the proposed protocol with real datasets. To this end,
we used the T-Drive Taxi trajectory dataset [YZX+10]. This dataset contains
around 15 million trajectory units collected from 10357 taxis over a period from
Feb. 2 to Feb. 8, 2008 in Beijing. Because the density of taxis is too low com-
pared to the synthetic dataset, we extracted and merged a period of one hour
in our tests, in order to generate a dataset containing 191 thousand trajectories
covering 32800 road segments.
To show the generality of PAMPAS, we selected three aggregate functions,
i.e., average, IDW [NWL12] and median, corresponding to the three aggregate
types described in Section 3.3. We associate the average and median aggregates
20
Figure 8: Aggregation time of PAMPAS and Baseline protocols in real dataset
(top) and synthetic dataset (bottom)
with the traffic monitoring application, i.e., compute the average travel time
and the median speed for each road segment in a road network. Hence, these
two scenarios consider the constrained movement type. The IDW aggregate is
associated to the noise-level monitoring application and a free movement type.
In this case, we use the same generated mobility traces, but consider them in the
2D space instead of the network space. Also, we use a 64x64 grid to divide the
observed 2D space into 4096 spatial units for the free movement scenario. The
speed sample values are directly generated by the moving objects generator,
while the noise values are generated by us proportionally to the number of
probes in the spatial unit.
7.2 Performance Evaluation
Execution time. Figure 8 shows the aggregation time (in a logarithmic scale)
for the three functions of both Baseline and PAMPAS protocols with 191 thou-
sand probes in Beijing and with 200 thousand probes in Stockton. The aggre-
gation time is global, i.e., it includes both the computation and communication
time. The results indicate that PAMPAS is very efficient since it requires only a
few seconds to compute the aggregate results for all the tested functions in both
datasets. Also, the aggregation times of PAMPAS are similar between the real
and the synthetic datasets. However, in both cases the baseline protocol is much
more costly (especially for complex aggregate functions) leading to aggregation
times up to three orders of magnitude higher than PAMPAS. Moreover, the
aggregation times with the baseline protocol are larger for the Beijing dataset.
The explanation is that the number of spatial units is larger in Beijing (i.e.,
32800) than in Stockton (i.e., 24123). On the other hand, PAMPAS is scalable
with respect to both the aggregation function and the number of spatial units
in the query.
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(a) Scalability of the
PAMPAS and Baseline
protocols with Average
function (top) and Me-
dian function (bottom)
(b) The partitioning costs
(top) and the partition-
ing imbalance factor (bot-
tom) with different num-
ber of partitions
(c) Communication and
computation costs of Me-
dian function with differ-
ent number of partitions
Figure 9: Performance evaluations
Scalability. We further test the scalability of the protocols with different
number of probes, spatial units, and aggregate functions. Figure 9a shows the
aggregation time for the two protocols for the average (top graph) and median
(bottom graph) functions with medium and large number of users on both road
networks. The results confirm that only PAMPAS is scalable w.r.t. all the
varying input parameters. In the worst case, the computation time attains 14
seconds to compute the median speed for 1.35 million samples covering 24123
spatial units.
The baseline protocol does not scale with the number of samples and espe-
cially with the number of spatial units. Practically, the baseline can provide
real-time aggregation only for a small number of spatial units (i.e., 7000 in Old-
enburg) and basic aggregate functions (e.g., average). The very limited RAM of
the SPs and the impossibility to efficiently parallelize the aggregate computa-
tion make the baseline inadequate for the requirements of participatory sensing
applications.
Cost and scalability of partitioning protocol. Figure 9b (top) presents
the partitioning computation time for both Oldenburg and Stockton networks.
A new partitioning can be computed in a few seconds by an SP. This means
that the checking and probes re-partitioning can be executed frequently, which
allows PAMPAS to adapt to even fast changes in the spatial distribution of
the probes. Most of the partitioning cost resides in reading and writing the
partitioning data to the secondary Flash storage. This also explains the increase
of the partitioning time with the number of partitions, since in this case the I/O
operations are executed at a smaller granularity, which is more costly.
Figure 9b (bottom) indicates that the partitioning unbalance factor, i.e.,
the ratio between the maximum and the average partition size, increases with
the number of partitions. The unbalance factor is an important indicator in
PAMPAS since the higher the unbalance, the higher the number of fake injected
samples and, therefore, the communication cost.
Figure 9c shows the impact of the number of partitions on the global ag-
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gregation time as well as on the computation and communication cost, which
compose the total time. The computation time decreases with the increase of
the number of partitions since the amount of work done by the aggregation
SPs also decreases. Conversely, the communication time increases with more
partitions since more fake samples are injected into the system as explained
above. Globally, the near-optimal aggregation time is obtained with a number
of partitions that minimizes the cumulated degradation of the computation and
communication costs (see Section 5). We obtained similar results with the real
dataset, for which the optimal number of partitions is 100 while the network
partitioning is computed in just 2 seconds. The aggregation costs are partially
shown in Figure 8 (top). Given the space limitation and the similarity of the
results with the synthetic datasets, we omit here the details of the results with
the real dataset.
Discussion. It is worth mentioning that the aggregation time can be greatly
improved by increasing the processing power and the communication bandwidth
of the SSI. For example, increasing the server bandwidth from 100Mbps to 1
GBps, makes the maximum aggregation time (i.e., median function with the
large Stockton dataset) to drop from 14 seconds to less than 7 seconds. Also, in
some scenarios, pushing the computation in the user devices may be problematic
(e.g., battery powered devices, concurrent applications running in the device).
However, PAMPAS minimizes this type of problem thanks to its design and its
high efficiency. For instance, in our tests, a user participating in the system
for one hour, has a probability between 3.5% and 8.7% to participate once to
an aggregate computation assuming that aggregates results are produced every
30 seconds, and a probability between 0.004% and 0.12% to do a repartitioning
assuming that the probes partitioning is checked every 1 minute. In all cases,
the computation is done in a few seconds at most and requires only modest
resources. Moreover, the computation effort is inversely proportional to the
probability to be picked.
8 Conclusion
This paper proposes PAMPAS, a privacy-aware mobile participatory sensing
system based on a distributed architecture and personal secure hardware. This
combination allows PAMPAS to achieve the same level of privacy as crypto-
graphic solutions without having to sacrifice generality, scalability, and accu-
racy. The proposed aggregation solution is, to the best of our knowledge, the
first proposal of a distributed protocol that is secure, efficient, and scalable and
that fits both the strict hardware constraints of secure personal devices and the
real-time constraints of participatory sensing applications. The experimental
evaluation based on representative hardware for secure platforms validates the
proposed solution.
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